The short-term stagflationary impact of stabilization policy in Sudan: a test of the new structuralist hypothesis by Hassanain, Khalifa
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1991
The short-term stagflationary impact of
stabilization policy in Sudan: a test of the new
structuralist hypothesis
Khalifa Hassanain
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hassanain, Khalifa, "The short-term stagflationary impact of stabilization policy in Sudan: a test of the new structuralist hypothesis"
(1991). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 16625.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/16625
The short-term stagflationary impact of 
stabilization policy in Sudan : 
A test of the new structuralist hypothesis 
by 
Khalifa M. A. Hassanain 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major: Economics 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1991 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Research Ob jecti ves 
Organization of the Study 
CHAPTER I. EVOLUTION OF THE SUDANESE ECONOMY 
Economic Structure of Sudan (1970 -1988 ) 
The Economic Crisis in Sudan 
Stagflation in Sudan: The GDP Growth Rates (1981 -1988 ) 
Inflation Rates (1981-88 ) 
The Bank of Sudan Credit Policy ( 1980-88 ) 
The Size of the Parall el Economy in the Sudan 
Some Evidence from the Agricultural Sectors 
CHAPTER II. MONETARIST STABILIZATION AND THE NEW 
STRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE 
Orthodox Stabilization Policies 
Previous Studies about IMF Policy in Sudan 
Monetary Contract i on 
Theoretical case for the new structuralists 
The Supply Response Me chanis m 
CHAPTER III. THE MODEL 
The Assumptions of the Model 
Page 
1 
2 
2 
4 
4 
5 
6 
10 
12 
15 
20 
25 
25 
27 
29 
30 
32 
35 
35 
iii 
The Sudanese Conditions 
The Model 
Aggregate supply - -the output f unction 
Estimation of the c urb market r ate 
The supply function 
Aggregate demand 
The price inflation function 
Monetary Contraction Effect on Supply and Demands 
The Data Base 
D. l 
D.2 
D.3 
D.4 
D.5 
D. 6 
D.7 
D.8 
D.9 
D.10 
CHAPTER IV. 
Income 
Wage 
Real effective exchange rate 
Monetary variable 
Prices 
Investment 
Black market exchange rate 
Consumption 
Export 
Government expenditure 
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATI ON 
Econometric Estimation 
The expec ted price inflation equation c ~e ) 
The real outpu t equation 
The private sector real investment demand equations 
The price inflation equation 
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
REFERENCES 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Page 
36 
37 
37 
39 
41 
41 
44 
46 
46 
47 
47 
47 
48 
48 
48 
49 
49 
49 
49 
50 
50 
50 
60 
64 
69 
72 
75 
79 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1950s , economis t s and policy makers have been 
i nc r easingly preoccupied with t he problems of infl ation a nd balance of 
payments disequilibria . The i r preoccupa t ion has l ed t o t he eme r gence of 
t he so-called monetar y approach to t h e balance of paymen ts. The ad-
herents to this approach typically assume that--in short-run models of an 
open economy- - supply behavior is fixed exogenously and thus so is real 
income. Inflation is , t herefore , viewed as the effec t of a continuing 
upward pressure i n aggregate demand . Their solution, therefore , is to 
restrict money and credit growth with its accompanying fiscal cutbacks. 
This is the analytic framework behind IMF stabilization policies ( Polak , 
1957). 
There is increasing evidence, however, that t hese models fail to 
capture elements that are necessar y t o understand and predict the 
consequences of credit policy in LDCs (VanWijnbergen. 1983, and the 
references mentioned therein ). Stabilization attempts ha ve persistently 
recorded a poor score on both real growth and inflation, overpredicting 
the first and underestimating the second. The problem is that the s uppl y 
s ide effect is not included in these model s. 
In LDCs. a significant production lag requires huge advances of 
money for working capital needs. Since equity and commodity markets are 
weak, these working capital needs to pay for labor and intermediate input 
costs are often financed by credit, thus raising costs. reducing output 
and raising prices. When monetary and credit supplies are cut. credit 
2 
rationing forces many firms to turn to an underground curb market--
higher than legal interest rate--for loans. The higher interest cost 
result s in a lower level of aggregate supply and, the r efore, exerts an 
upward pressure on prices. 
Research Objectives 
The purpose of this study is to model the interaction between the 
monetary sector and the real sector i n the Sudan by focusing on the 
prominent role played by the rate of return in the parallel--unofficial -
-sector of the Sudanese economy. This will make it possible to predict 
the short-run impact of a tight monetary policy and test the hypothesis 
of an immediate stagflationary impact coming from the supply side of t he 
economy. 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter I starts with a description of the sectoral distribution of 
the GDP over time. Following that is a brief overal l review of the 
economic c risis in Sudan. The problem of stagflation is then traced 
throughout the period from 1981 to 1988 . The last part of this chapter 
provides information about the size of the parallel sector and some 
further evidence from the agricultural sector. This i s particularly 
important because monetary contraction causes stagflation through the 
parallel sector . 
Chapter II reviews the new structuralist critique of the monetarist 
theory of inflation. It starts with a typical IMF stabilization program 
and its theoretical basis . Previous studies about stabilization in Sudan 
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are then reviewed. Monetary contraction is then described. A survey 
across the new structuralist models besides a detailed description of the 
supply response mechanism concludes this chapter . 
Chapter III is about the model setup, it starts with citation of 
similar studies from the literature, the basic assumptions of the mode l 
are then stated. Following is the model setup and a description of how 
in the model context monetary contraction affects supply and demand. The 
last part of this chapter deals with the data base. Chapter IV deals 
with the econometric estimation issues and Chapter V is the summary and 
conclusions . 
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CHAPTER I. EVOLUTION OF THE SUDANESE ECONOMY 
Economic Structure of Sudan ( 1970-1988) 
This part contains information about the relative importance of the 
different sectors of the Sudanese economy . This is intended to show the 
sectors that dominate the economy and , therefore, the policy effect on 
them dete rmines the policy effect on the whole economy . 
The Sudanese economy i s dominated by its agricultural sector. The 
sector provides for more than 90% of total foreign exchange earnings out 
of exports, ove r 30% of GDP, and about 45% of total employment (see Table 
1.1 ) . Most productive capacity that lies outside agriculture is depend-
ent on it as a source of raw materials or as a consumer of goods a nd 
services. The sector contains three main subsectors ." namel y the tradi-
tional rain-fed subsector , t he mechanized rain- fed subsector and t he 
irrigated s ubsector . The sector clearly occupies a dominant position in 
the economy of Sudan. 
The i ndustrial sector, on the othe r hand , produces only about 6% of 
the GDP. One-third of manufacturing value a dded comes from traditional 
small- scale industry, the sector is also a valuable source of employment 
a nd i ncome for many Sudanese . The sector is characterized by excessive 
undercapacity utilization . Capaci t y utilization in manufacturing plants 
is est imated at only 20 -30% with rates in private companies ave raging 
about t wice those of the public sec tor ente rprises (World Bank. 1985). 
The domesti c industry and a s i gnificant portion of the agricul tural 
sector depends heavily on i mported capi t al and intermediate goods. 
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Table 1.1. Sectoral distribution of GDP, export, and labor force in the 
Sudan 
Indicator Year Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
Percent share in GDP 1970 43 15 42 
1980 34 14 52 
1988 36 15 49 
Contribution to 1970/71 89 11 
value of exports (%) 1977 /78 95 5 
1982/83 90 10 
Distribution of 1970/71 70 3 27 
labor force (%) 1077 /78 69 4 27 
1982/83 70 5 31 
Source: Elbadawi ( 1991 ). 
The service sector, including both social and economic services. is 
relatively large , constituting r oughly 507. of GDP compared to an average 
of about 307. of all low income countries. Within this sector transport 
and trade dominate. 
The declining share in the GDP of the primary producing sectors. and 
the increasing s hare of the service sector (a supposedly unproductive 
sector) is believed to be associated with the expansion of the parallel 
economy. The ratio of the GDP generated in the parallel economy to the 
regular GDP grew from 2.97. in 1972 to 90.37. in 1986 ( Elbadawi , 1988 ). 
The Economic Crisis in Sudan 
Since the 70s. the economy of Sudan has been passing through a 
period of unsatisfactory macroeconomic performance. The international 
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monetary fund (IMF), for example, diagnosed the problem as a result of a 
number of domes tic and external developments affecting the budgetary 
operations, credit expansion and cost price relationships have resulted 
in structural disequilibria in Sudanese economy. These are clearly 
indicated by the severe imbalances in the budget and the balance of 
payments (see Table 1 .2). In addition to taking steps to eliminate the 
causes of the imbalance, the Fund has persistently urged the government 
to take corrective action through depreciation of the Sudanese pound 
(Ali, 1985) . As a result, t he Sudanese pound was devalued four times 
between 1978-1984. The issue of devaluation is one of the most unpopula r 
issues usually recommended for LDCs by the Fund. Sudan, of course . is no 
exception. Sudanese scholars have always emphasized that the supply 
elasticity of Sudanese exports and the demand elasticity for i mpor ts are 
extremely low for the devaluation to have its effect (Ali. 1985 ). They 
also stressed that Sudan suffered from economic mismanagement crisis, not 
structural imbalance and admitted to the need for fiscal and monetary 
improvements r athe r than a devaluation for a remedy ( Hassan, 1989). 
This research , however, deals with different aspects of the IMF 
stabilization program in Sudan, namely the stagflationary impact of 
c redit control on private sector lending . 
Stagflation in Sudan: 
The GDP Growth Rates (1981-1988) 
The gross domestic product (GDP) series which is based on the 
national income accounts has some well-known problems associated with it. 
Nevertheless. it is the best income data available fo r Sudan. The GDP 
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Table 1.2. Sudan : Summary of macro indicators 
Item 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
LS millions 
GDP (86/ 87) current 
price s 8330 . 8 3278. 0 28158 . 0 29409.0 30676.0 31362.0 
Current account 
balance -210 -257.2 -80. 2 298.5 - 53.7 -701.9 
Percent of current price GDP 
I mports 
Exports 
Current account 
balance 
Central government 
14 
5 
- 2 
Current revenues 15 
Current expenditures 9 
Development 
expenditures 4 
Growth rates 
GDP (constant pr ice ) 
Mone y suppl y 
1982/ 83 
0 . 4 
26 
70/ 71 
USS millions 
Ex t ernal publ i c debt 
( MIR-dis bursed only ) 
De bt ser vice ratio (%) 
Cot ton exports 
300 
14 
1500 
15 
7 
- 2 
12 
9 
13 
10 
5 
-1 
15 
9 
13 
10 
4 
1 
13 
13 
15 
1983/ 84 1984/ 85 
-2.9 
31 
72/ 73 
370 
12 
1200 
77/ 78 
1800 
14 
749 
-12.8 
32 
80/ 81 
3100 
27 
460 
8 
3 
- .1 
16 
14 
18 
1985/ 86 
12.9 
45 . 4 
81/ 82 
5000 
41 
260 
Source. Mini stry of Planning Economic Surveys. various issues . 
6 
4 
-2 
14 
13 
16 
1986/ 87 
3. 4 
29 
82/ 83 
5100 
41 
630 
Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various issues (World Bank. 1985) . 
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average growth rate over the period 1981/ 82 - 1987/88 is about - .247. per 
year . A cl oser look at the series Table 1 .3 shows that output growth 
rates have been fluctuating ove r time. Specifically , there is a posi tive 
growth period (81/82 - 82/83) of .8%, a negative growth period (83/84 -
84/ 85) of - 7 .857., a remarkable turnover to a pos itive average rate of 
growth of 8.157. during 85/86 - 86/87) a nd finall y a moderate negative 
growth rate of - 3.47. in 1987/88. 
Table 1. 3. Percent !). in prices and real GDP (1981/82 prices) 
Low salaries High salaries 
Year Real 7.t. in GDP Year index 7.t. index 7.f). Average 
80/81 4. 6 1981 24.6 23 .9 24.3 
81/82 1. 2 1982 25.6 26 .7 26.2 
82/83 0 . 4 1983 30.6 31. 7 31. 2 
83/84 - 2.9 1984 34.2 30.7 32.5 
84/85 -12.8 1985 45.3 47.2 46.3 
85/86 12.9 1986 29.8 28.4 29.1 
86/ 87 3.4 1987 25.9 24.0 25.0 
87/88 -3. 9 1988 48.7 46.9 47.8 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Report, various issues. 
A conside rable number of e vents could be put fo rward to explain t his 
instabil ity. These events for exampl e i nclude the IMF l iberalization 
experiment wi th Sudan (1970 -84 ) and che posc-1984 per i od. Taylor (1988, 
and t he reference mentioned therein) sees the problem as associated wi th 
the investment boom around 1978 . The idea was to transform Sudan into 
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the breadbasket of the Middle Eas t . The transformation failed f or 
reasons that involved both technical difficulties and bad e c onomic 
management of existing agricultural products. Traditional exports of 
cotton and other crops declined while ce reals never made it into the 
picture. He a l so argued that capital flight , mainly by Sudanese working 
a broad , traders with their presumabl y high earning flows (enhanced by 
inflationary income redistribution in their f avor ) and the military is 
anot:he r s t o r y behind stagflati on . Meanwhil e, both the "official" and 
productive sec t ors of the economy are starved of f oreign exchange , 
provoki ng austere IMF polic ies which among other politically vi s ibl e 
effec t s l ed t o food riots in 1985 when c onsume r subsidies were cut 
(Tayl or , 1988) . 
Devalua tion. which i s the cor e of the IMF stabilization progr a m, i s 
believed t o have caused disproportiona t e s upply r e sponses of ma jor 
exportabl e goods in Sudan (e.g., cotton, gum a r abic) (Umbadda , 1985). 
Th e de cline i n the world prices fo r key expor t goods t oge ther with r ising 
i mport prices during 1980-82 is another factor contribut ing to the 
pr obl em (Wor l d Bank , 1983). 
Given t he afor eme ntioned even ts . variation i n t he GDP can also be 
expla ined by variation in a gricul t ural output and t he problems associated 
with it. In 1984-8 5 t he eff ect of drought a nd shor t ages of rainfall , 
rain- f ed crop production declined s ubstan t i ally . The agricultura l sec t or 
s hare in GDP dro pped to 28.27. compa r ed to 29.67. in 1983 - 84 . Dur i ng 1985-
86 while t he r eal GDP in absolute amount i nc r ea sed by LS-1 65 mi l lion . t he 
c on tribution of agricul t ure was LS 377 million , which i s 357. of the GDP. 
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Again, a lower share of agricultural outpu t can explain the lower rates 
of growth of the GDP during 1986 - 87 and 1987-88. Heavy rains and floods 
c r eated irrigat i on problems in 1987-88. The rigidities or the problems 
associated with the agricul tural sector include foreign exchange availa -
bility, lack of seasona l labor and l ack of credit (The World Bank , 1985 ). 
Inflation Rates (1981 -88) 
Despite the continued restrictive monetary and credit policy 
measures which have been i mplemented in recent years. inflation, as 
measured by cos t of living indices, continued its upward trend during the 
period under revi ew (81-88) (see Tabl e 1 .3, which shows the cost of 
living indices for l ow and high income groups for the same period). On 
average, t he general leve l of prices rose by 35.9 percent pe r annum 
during t he 1981-85 period. 
A combination of factors is believed to have contributed to the 
cont i nuation of the price rise during the period under consideration. 
These include the frequent appreciation of t he dollar in the free marke t 
leading to higher prices of imports , rising internal cost of production 
and the increase in prices of imported consumer goods due to the frequent 
valuation of import duties according to adjustment in exchange rates. A 
further e lement in the price rise during the period under review was the 
negative growth rate in GDP, which was adversely reflected upon produc -
tion in the various sectors of the economy. Moreover , continuous 
increases in salari es and wages in r ecent years and the inflationary 
tendencies generated thereon were also among the factors affecting the 
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rise in t he general level of prices. 
Accord i ng to data in Table 1.3 t he upward trend in the general l evel 
of domestic prices continued through 1985. During 1986, inflation 
decelerated to 29. 1%. The slower rate of infl ation could be explained by 
the import of meat and f urthe r drop in the prices of sorghum and vege-
tables due to good harvest. During 1987, the increase in the cost of 
living indices r ecorded a further decline to 24.1% and 22.4i. for lower 
and higher salaried persons. Howeve r , it is worth noting t hat in 1986-
87 the cost of living indices included a number of official prices which 
made t he cost of l i ving indices published data unrepresentative to the 
fully con s umer price increases . In 1988. there was a sharp increase in 
the rate of change in prices in the first three quarters. The rate of 
inflation increased sharply in mid -1988 due to shortages of basic 
commodities. 
Other explanations are also offered by Sudanese scholars for 
inflation. For example. M. N. Hussain (1985) believes that imported 
inflation played the major role not onl y in initiating domestic infla-
tion. but also in forcing the government to rely on deficit financing , 
thereby leading to excessive money balances. It has. therefore. been 
argued that the excessive money balances were the result of domestic 
inflation initiated by inflated import prices . rather than the cause. 
Elbadawi ( 1988, a nd the references mentioned therein) beli eves that 
deficit financ ing is the heart of the problem. Domestic money supply 
rose from LS 1825 million at the end of 1981-82 to LS 9011 million at the 
end of 1986-87, with an annual average rate of expansion totalling 40% 
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over the period. Also, private sector borrowing increased from 936.59 
million in 1981-82 to 3460.0 million in 1986-87 , an increase of 2707.. 
Due to the high rates of return to black market dealings most of these 
funds are believed to have been used to finance black market operations. 
I n t he fol l owing, I wi l l t r ace the history of credit policy in Sudan 
for the period 1980-88. This is particularly important because it is one 
of the main instruments through which the IMF stabilization program tried 
to improve the position of the balance of payments and to lower infla-
tion. 
The Bank of Sudan Credit Policy ( 1980 - 88) 
The bas ic objective of t he Bank of Sudan Credi t Policy is to outl ine 
the r ole of t he bank in influencing the volume a nd the direction of 
credit extended by commercial banks to the private sector according t o 
the stated economic policy objectives. 
During 1980 the c r edit policy based on the Fund program ~imed at 
curtailing credit to imports, private and professional loans, and medium-
and long - term capital investment. On the other hand, facilities to 
exports , local industries and other productive sectors of the economy 
were to be promoted. In line with the policy of restricting credit, an 
advisory committee headed by t he Governor of the Central Bank was 
established in March 1980. The main task of the commi ttee was to 
scrutinize applications submitted to commercial banks for credit exceed-
ing a certain amount. It is worth noting that by the end of December 
1980 actual c redit to the private sector was below the newly set target 
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by LS 90 million. During 1981 , interest rates on advances and savings 
were raised by 2% in accordance with the declared credit policy objec -
tives . Bank of Sudan placed a ceiling on the volume of c r edit to be 
extended to the private sector by each commercial bank. Subsectoral 
ce ilings, however , were left to comme r cial banks to decide. By the end 
of December 1981 actual c r edit t o the private sec t or was below target by 
35.7 million. Interes t rates were a lso r aised by 3% during 1982. In 
1983, a new credit policy was issued with t he same major object i ves and 
some minor changes in the subceilings, and as a result , the rate of 
growth of credit t o t he private sector went down from 46.9% i n 1982 to 
20.5% in 1983. In 1984 , a new policy was issued i n line with the 
previousl y stated objective of restricting credit a nd as a result. t he 
ra t e of growth of credit t o t he private sector slowed to 17%. In 1 985, 
the growth rate continued to be 17%. The main ob jectives of t he policy 
issued in 1986 were again the containing of the growth of money supply in 
line with the growth of the economy and t o ensure adequate flow of credit 
to priority sec t ors such as agriculture, industry and export. The rate 
of growth of credit extended to the private sector was 40%. In 1987, the 
subceiling had been unified and commercial banks were given greater 
freedom in allocation of t heir credit . customer-wise the growth rate of 
credit was 44% . In 1988, the growth was 19%; the objectives of the 
policy were monetary stability and the combat of inflation without 
stifling economic development. There were no new major c hanges from the 
1987 policy . As mentioned before, des pi te those efforts to cutback 
inflation and to increase output, inflation continued t o register high 
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r ates of growth throughout the period and output continued to fluctuate 
over time. 
We should also note that at this stage, as it is clear from Table 
1.4, that for example if for analytical purposes we divide the period 
under consideration i nto three subperiods, namely 1981-82, 1983-85 and 
1986-87, the rates of growth in private sector domestic credit, inflation 
and output seems to have a certain pattern. The first subperiod wit-
nessed an average rate of growth in domestic credit of 397., average 
inflation rate of 25.257. and average rate of GDP, though, measured in 
terms of fiscal years of 2.97.. A high rate of growth in c redit is 
associated with a relatively low i nflation and a positive rate of growth 
in GDP though not high. For the second period. the rates were 18%. 37%, 
and -5.1. respectively. The trend in this subperiod is clearer--low 
credi t, high i nflation, negative GDP. For the third subperiod, the rates 
were 427. , 277. and 8.15. once more high credit. relatively lower inflation 
and high positive growth of GDP . This could raise a question about 
c redit planning i n Sudan and whether credit needs of the different 
produc tive activities of the private sector are met from the regular 
banking system or whether the rate of growth of credit extended to the 
private sector is adequate to finance their productive activities. This. 
of course, is not a claim t hat--as it is clear from the previous discus-
sion--rnone tary contraction is solely responsible fo r stagflation in Sudan 
rather it is a question of t he degree to which it can contribute to its 
explanation. 
The effect of monetary contraction on prices and output is usually 
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Table 1. 4. 
%6 in Domestic Credit Average 46 Fiscal %6 in 
Year t o t he Private Sector in Price s Year Real GDP 
1980 79/80 
1981 31 24.3 80/81 4.6 
1982 47 • 26.2 81/82 1. 2 
1983 20 31. 2 82/83 0.4 
1984 17 32.5 83/84 - 2.9 
1985 17 46.3 84/85 -12.8 
1986 40 29. 1 85/86 12.9 
1987 44 25.0 86/87 3.4 
1988 19 47.8 87/88 - 3.9 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Report, various issues. 
transferred through the unofficial money market (Bruno, 1979; VanWijnber-
gen, 1982; Taylor, 1983: Buffie, 1984). To complete the specification 
for the Sudanese economy let us have an insight into the Sudanese 
parallel economy. Informal credit is believed to be one of the main 
blocks forming the parallel economy in Sudan. 
The Size of the Parallel Economy 
in the Sudan 
In this part . I will review the work of Elbadawi (1988) and will 
provide further evidence on the parall el economy in the agricultural 
sector. the mainstay of the Sudanese economy . 
The Sudan is believed to have a sizable parallel economy. The spill 
over effects from an underground economy such as the one in Sudan can be 
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Table 1.5. Deposits and advances of commercial banks 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Advances of commercial 
banks 1142537 1376923 1609191 1776704 263759 
Deposits of commercial 
banks 1339560 1781357 2603602 362257 5136929 
Advances/ Deposits 85 . 3% 77. 3% 77. 97% 49% 59 . 3% 
Source: Ministry of Planning Economic Surveys, various issues. 
quite frustrating to the conduct of macroeconomic policy. Using a simple 
model of demand for money balances in addition to the definition of 
velocity and the equilibrium condition in the mone y market Elbadawi 
(1988) estimated the size of the income generated in the parallel economy 
or what he termed "missing " income. He argued that there are two 
opposing factors that have been working on the veloci t y of mone y in 
Sudan. One is the increased urbanization of the economy during the last 
two decades besides the successive monetization of the agricultural 
sector. the mainstay of the Sudanese econ omy. This is also the period 
which witnessed the expansion of the highly monetized activities of the 
service sector. The combined effect of these factors, he argued , is 
supposed to slow down the velocity of money. On the other hand. the 
increased number of banking and financial institutions in the country 
during the last decade is supposed to increase the efficiency in the use 
of money where a lesser amount of money is ne eded to support a given 
17 
level of transaction, thus causing a rise in velocity. The accelerated 
rate of domestic inflation and the expectations of future exchange rate 
devaluation in Sudan are supposed to reduce the demand for money, but 
since the stock of money is given the level of transaction must rise so 
that this stock is willingly held, hence , velocity should rise. 
According to Table 1.6, he argued the veloci t y of money has ex-
perienced both considerable and consistent slow down over three periods. 
Between 1960 and 1987 this is obviously inconsistent with the behavior of 
other variables in Table 1.6, namely rates of growth in money supply (Ml) 
prices and GDP. He went on arguing that this slow down can only be 
explained by the existence of a large and expanding parallel economy in 
Sudan since, perhaps, the last decade and one half. Th~ parallel 
economy, however, is believed to have started expanding rapidly only 
after the post-1979 liberalization era (Umbada and SheaelDin. 1985). The 
conditions of high inflation , expectations of future devaluations besides 
the tendency of the economy towards developing excess demand are the main 
factors behind the expansion of the parallel economy . The black market 
for foreign exchange is another chain that constitutes the parallel 
economy. The ratio of currency in circulation to total money supply is 
another measure of the size of the parallel economy. Transactions are 
done in cash in order to cover these activities and for the purpose of 
tax evasion. Despite the expansion of the banking s ystem during the 
post-1979 period, the CURR/Ml ratio increased to an a nnual average of 44% 
during this period as compared to 43% during the 1975-1978 period. 
Furthermore , it is widely believed that funds acquired from the banking 
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Table 1.6. Ml velocity and other macroeconomic indicators means and 
(standard deviations ) 
Period Velocity 
1961-74 6.7 
( 1. 23) 
1975-78 5.0 
(0.41) 
1979-87 3.3 
(0.44) 
1961-87 5.3 
( 1. 8) 
% t:N 
-3.95 
(8 . 01) 
- 3 .59 
(5.72) 
-4.79 
(14.04) 
-4.18 
(9.86) 
Curr/Ml 
% 
54 
(3) 
43 
(2 .3) 
44 
(2.8) 
49 
(5.8) 
Source: Elbadawi (1988). 
11" 
% 
6 
(8) 
14 
(8) 
25 
(7) 
14 
(11) 
Rate of Growth 
in Ml% 
13. 3 
(9.6) 
24.6 
(7 . 6) 
26.7 
(10.0) 
19.4 
(11.2) 
Rate of Growth 
in GDP% 
3 
( 8) 
6 
( 9) 
-3 
(12) 
2 
(10) 
system as loans to the private sector have been routinely used to finance 
transactions in the parallel economy. Based on the findings of Domowitz 
and Elbadawi (1987) regarding stable demand for money function in the 
Sudan, Elbadawi (1988) estimated the "missing" income of the parallel 
economy. He obtained a revised figure for the GDP, and he obtained the 
. 
missing income as a difference between the YR and the reported GDP Y. He 
also estimated a rev ised velocity based on YR (see Table 1.7). The 
figures he obtained are fairly consistent with the evidence from the 
Sudanese economy. The missing income was shown to exhibit a sustained 
and considerable rate of growth with the first jump in it taking place in 
1979, the beginning of liberalization. The estimated missing income of 
the parallel economy i s then shown to pursue a rising trend before 
declining sharpl y in 1983-84. The year 1983 witnessed a ma jor effort by 
the state to quell the expansion of the black market while t he end of 
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Table 1. 7. Inc omes in r egular and paralle l economies a nd the velocity of 
money in the Sudan (mill i ons of Sudanese pounds) 
% of unreported 
Year to r egular GDP Revised V v 
72 2.9 5.35873 5.20844 
73 4 . 1 5.27843 5. 07289 
74 3 .4 5.43349 5.25379 
75 3. 1 5.53732 5.37078 
76 5 .8 5 .58373 5.27698 
77 10.4 5.19585 4.70765 
78 13.l 5. 14613 4.55043 
79 26.9 4.93789 3.88978 
80 37.0 5 . 08466 3. 71064 
81 63.8 5.12856 3.13064 
82 71. 9 5.12802 2.98231 
83 40.8 5.02021 3.56620 
84 31. 9 4. 96872 3.76818 
85 70.8 4.85323 2.84153 
86 90.3 5.24505 2.75652 
87 85.6 5.48364 2.95474 
Source: Elbadawi (1988). 
1984 is t he year of a severe drought and a consequent decline in economic 
activity. The ris i ng trend in this income, however. was firmly rees-
tabl i s hed during t he subsequent years. The rat i o of t he missing i ncome 
to repor ted GDP averaged 35% dur ing the 1970 - 1987 period and the figure 
for the 1979-1987 period is almost 58%. 
The i mplicati on of these findings fo r macroeconomic pol icies in 
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Sudan are great. Maredo (1985) argued that the link between the elements 
of the parallel economy--smuggling, informal credit, and black market for 
foreign exchange--have severely constrained commercial, monetary and 
exchange rate policy in the Sudan. In fact, even the regular banking 
system which is 60% owned by the state is believed to have provided 
credit to finance transacti ons in t he parallel economy . Elbadawi (1988) 
with such a sizeable parallel economy competing with the regular economy 
for working capital in order to finance desired transactions, the role of 
monetary policy as a major stimulus to real economic growth and equity 
will be greatly undermined . To be sure the role of monetary expansion is 
already intolerably high and the system is fairly monetized. Due to the 
high rate of return in the parallel economy, ~ tight monetary policy, 
however, may lead to disproportionate financial repression and severe 
deflation of the regular economy with the significant portion of credit 
being drawn to the parallel ec onomy. Some signs that this development 
might have already taken place is evidenced from the declining share in 
GDP of the primary practicing sectors, and the increasing share of the 
service sector which is closely associated with the parallel economy. 
Some Evidence from the Agricultural Sectors 
The agricultural s ector, as has repeatedly been said here , is the 
mainstay of the Sudanese economy. The sector provides for more than 90% 
of the total foreign exchange earnings out of exports, over 30% of gross 
domestic product (GDP), and about 45% of total employment in Sudan (see 
Table 1 .8) . 
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Table 1 . 8 . Key indicators of the agricultural sector role in the Sudan 
economy 
Indicator Year Percent 
Share of agriculture in GDP 
Contribution to foreign exchagne earnings 
Share to GDP of government investment in agriculture 
Share of total investment in GDP 
Share of total empl oyment 
Source: Elbadawi ( 1991). 
1988/89 
1986/ 87 
1984/85 
1984/85 
1982/83 
36 
93 
8 
17 
44 
In this part , I will provide some evidence for the existence and the 
size of the unorgani zed or the (curb ) money market in the sector . The 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) is the main source of agricultural 
credit for the sector , other commer cial banks allocate a s mall portion of 
thei r portfolio for agricultural credit. Despite the fact tha t the 
agricultural sector dominates the economy , the total local portfolio of 
the ABS was 20, 26, 76, 85 LS million in 1981, 1984, 1986 , and 1987, 
respectively. As a percentage of total credit extended to the private 
sector, it was 3%, 2%, 3% , and 2%, respectivel y. 
Most of the ABS loans go to t he cotton sector or the rain-fed 
mechanized sector, and most of course for t he purchase of machinery 
(World Bank, 1985 ) . 
Until recently, tradit ional farmers in Sudan knew only of the 
informal sources of agricul tural credit. They stil l largely depend on 
the informal suppliers of agricultural credit. These include the village 
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merchant, the pure money lender, large farmers, friends and relatives. 
Credit from these informal sources ca.me to be known in the Sudan as the 
"sheil system." Medium traditional farmers obtain the highest amount of 
the informal credit. Borrowing is mainly for consumption and farming 
activities. A high proportion of traditional farmers use the sheil 
system. In a study by the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (Oct. 1987), it was 
found that 57% of small farmers, 33% of medium and 9% of large farmers 
used the s heil system. The most commonly used methods of the sheil are 
cash against agricultural output and advance payment for labor work. The 
cost of credi t of the sheil system has been estimated differently by 
different researchers (e .g., the ABS study mentioned the cost was found 
to be 110%). Another study by Technoserve, Inc. (1987) about credit in 
Elobeid came out with the average rate for reported sheil credit was 20% 
but ranged from 10% to 110%. Evidence for the existence of sheil in the 
irrigated agricultural subsector--which produces more than 50% of the 
agricultural output--can be found for example in S. T. Saleem ( 1987), who 
used a sample Gazira and Rahed irrigated schemes and stated that 55% out 
of 98 tenants traded in sheil during the relevant season. The observed 
rates of interest presented in this study ranged be tween 172% and 201%. 
Elbadawi (1987) talked about the inadequacy of credit among other 
things for agricultural production. The rural agricultural markets are 
quite segmented . In the absence. government , small merchants or sur-
rogate traders enjoy a virtual monopsony. The majority of small holders 
in the traditional sector deal with this market. He then argued that in 
some case s , these farmers may depend on the "shail " credit system. 
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"Sheil" credits sometimes make profits as high as 200%. In the case of 
gum arabic--the contribution of gum arabic to total foreign exchange 
earnings is about 17%. It is the second largest after cotton--it is 
estimated that about 30% of total production is sold in this market , 40% 
through the "sheil" c redit system and only 30% sold in the auction 
markets. The World Bank ( 1985 )•on t he other hand argued that although 
part of the cost to borrowers under "sheil" system reflect the cost of 
providing valuabl e services in remote areas where ordinary lenders find 
it difficult to func t ion, t he r eal interest charges are very high (and 
often explosive) varying anywhere between 100%-300% per annum . 
Evidence of the size and the interest rate of t he unorganized money 
market in developing countries i ncluding Sudan is also found in U. Tumwai 
( 1977). He talked about the phenomena as being defined through and 
associated with rural credi t markets. He also provided data for the 
different noninstituti onal rates of interest for the period 1968-1971 for 
the Sudan as 60% . 30%, and 200%. He also named them as: usual, occa-
sional , and exceptional, r espectively. 
To s um up, what we said so far is that during the period between 
1979-1984 and t he pos t-1984 period the Sudan was engaged in a series of 
Fund- s upported programs. The IMF program among other things slowed down 
the rate of growth of c r edit to the private sector. The period also 
witnessed on average , l ow rates of gr owth and sometimes negat i ve ones of 
the Sudanese GDP coupled with high rates of inflation. A number of 
events domestically and international ly are believed to have an input on 
stagflation in Sudan. The question that I am raising here, to repeat, is 
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to what extent contraction of credit extended to the private sector 
forced private firms and/or small farmers to borrow from the unorganized 
money markets at higher rates of interest and thus contributed to 
stagflation in Sudan. 
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CHAPTER II . MONETARIST STABILIZATION AND 
THE NEW STRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE 
This chapter contains a description of a typical IMF stabilization 
program , its theoretical basis , and a review of some of t he studies on 
the Sudanese stabilization programs. The c hapter contains a detailed 
description of the policy of monetary contraction and a survey across the 
new-structuralist anti-monetarist models besides a detailed description 
of t he supply response mechanism to monetary contraction. 
Orthodox Stabilization Polic ies 
The standard economic polic i es usually inc luded in the orthodox 
packages f or countries facing bal a nce of payment difficulties accelerat-
i ng inflation and blatant mismanagement in key sectors of its economy 
a r e: 
1. Monetary contraction , usually due to the imposition of separate 
ceilings on credit from the banking system to the privat€ sector and 
the central government. 
2 . Deval uation, either explicit or in disguised fashion through cuts in 
quotas , higher prior deposits for imports and subsidies for exports. 
and general tightening of trade restrictions. In country , econo -
mists may pr efer the latter package of indirect measures , while the 
IMF typically presses for a devaluation up front. 
3. Abolition or reduction of government intervention in the price 
system, for example, consumer food subsidies. 
26 
4. Internal financial reform and liberalization , in particular, 
attempts to raise interest rates. 
5 . External liberalization in the f o rm of reduction of barriers in 
trade and capital flows. 
6. With or without discrete devaluation, there may be a device to slow 
the rate at which the l ocal currency i s devalued over time in a 
crawling peg . The slower crawl is supposed t o da mpen expectations 
and be an anti-inflationary f or ce. 
7. Freezing of wage demands is often recommended to cut inflationary 
pressure and perhaps shift the income dist ribution t oward high-
saving profit recipients and the upper middle class . 
Theoretically, the IMF programs are based on the so-called monetary 
approach to the balance of payments ( Polak , 1957; Frenkel & Johnson, 
1976) . The a pproach was developed in the 1960s and early 1970s primarily 
by Mundel (1968) and Johnson (1976); more recent contributions are 
numerous , among them Dornbusch ( 1973 ), Mus sa (1974), Blejer ( 1979), and 
Johannes (1981) (On t he quantita t ive fund macro projections see Moh-
sinskhan , Peter Montiel and Nadeem, J. Haque, 1990). The basic assump-
tions of the monetary approach are a fixed e xchange rate, stable demand 
for money and stabl e process t hrough which the money supply is generated. 
The IMF policies have targeted inflation as one of its prime enemies, 
however, many of t hese monetarist policies have y i elded disappointing 
r esults at least in the area of controlling inflation. 
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Previous Studies about IMF Policy in Sudan 
In the context of the Sudanese economy, the devaluation issue has 
received a lot of attention. For example, M. N. Hussain ( 1985) believes 
that the IMF diagnosis of domestic inflation in the Sudan as a result of 
excessive money supply to finance government deficits and the expansion 
of bank credit is not appropriate. Inflation, he argued, is mainly 
imported and the excessive money balances are the result of domestic 
inflation rather than the cause. It was not only IMF diagnosis of 
domestic inflation that was inappropriate, but also its claim of an 
overvalued Sudanese exchange ra te. He argued that Sudan's exchange rate 
was undervalued at least the four years before the 1978 balance of 
payment crisis. He went on and argued that the IMF justified devaluation 
on Sudan on the basis of supply sided argument, but did not consider the 
response of import costs, domestic costs, and export supply to the 
reduction in foreign price of domestic currency. 
Umbadda and Shaaeldin (1985) concluded that devaluation. trade 
liberalization, breaking of government monopolies, and d issolution of 
government enterprises were not effective in terms of the major factor 
constraining the economy, i.e., productive capacity. They believe in 
long-term planning and a leading efficient public sector. Again, M. N. 
Hussain (1985) conducted a more general a nd dynamic analysis of the 
determinants of the relationship between "competitiveness" and "produc-
tivity . " He concluded that the program resulted in less supply of 
exports , higher import bill , worsened balance of payment. high inflation 
and negative growth . M. H. Diab (1985 ) used Taylor's model to investi-
28 
gate t he price and i ncome e f fects of devaluation and concluded that the 
effects are adverse on the bal ance of trade . He further argued that 
devaluation wi ll reduce the supply of home goods and redistribute income 
unequally. 
Nashash ibis ' (1980) study of the cost structure and competitiveness 
of Sudan's major export crops suggested a depreciation of the Sudanese 
pound to restore profitability of exports supporting the IMF program. 
Ali (1985), using Nashashibi ' s common supply framework showed that the 
actual 1978 -1983 devaluations were either in the wrong direction or at 
the wrong magnitudes . He also argued that the exchange rate should have 
been revalued effective in 1981 according to the competitiveness criteria 
rather than devalued. Elbadawi (1988) conducted a study on Sudan's 
collapsing exchange rates and the speculative attacks on offi cial reserve 
to the case when c urrency inconvertibility gives rise to a black market 
for foreign exchange. He concluded that the fiscal deficits in most of 
the LDCs are the root causes of the problem. Therefore, in order for 
incentive policies to s ucceed, the issues of government finance and 
resources mobili zation should be top priority in LDCs economic reform 
package. 
The issue of monetary contracti on to the best of my knowledge has 
not received attention from Sudanese scholars. or there is no written 
work about it. Except that commercial banks used to complain about 
credit ceilings and that they could lend to the productive sectors above 
the ceiling which they claim would increase output and reduce prices. 
• 
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Monetary Contraction 
There are two justifications for monetary expansion, which get 
muddled in the minds of practitioners of applied orthodoxy. The first is 
based on the equation of exchange from the quantity theory of money, 
which states that the value (price times quantity) of transactions in the 
economy is proportional to mone y supply. If the quantity of transactions 
or output stays constant, then smaller money stock ought to be associated 
with a l ower price level. On this rationale , cutting money supply or at 
least its growth is a key anti-inflationary move. 
Open economy mone tarism retains the hypothesis of the equation of 
exchange and stable output (or , effectively, full employment ) but adds 
t he notion that the price level is determined in the short to medium-run 
e i t her from competition of imported goods or from labor and intermediate 
import costs, that is, the l evel of wage and exchange rate. The IMF 
couples these assump t i ons with the balance sheet identity for the banking 
system--any r i se in the money suppl y (the bank's main liability item) 
must be balanced by increases in loans to the governmen t or private firms 
or else by higher foreign exchange reserves ( bank ' s l oans and foreign 
exchange holdings are their princ ipal assets). Monetary restriction 
takes t he form of ceiling on credit to the government and private sector: 
the main benefits are supposed to come in the form of higher rese rves not 
lower prices. Because Polak's (1957) model, which is t he base of the 
stabilization programs focuses on the relationship between credit 
expansion and change in foreign assets (NFA), (NFA) is assumed in the 
model to depend on exports, capital movements and change in domestic 
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credit (NDC). The latter is the policy variable that can be used to 
control (NFA). 
To apply the open economy monetarist model in detail, first, make 
projections of output and the price level, then you have money demand. 
Put limits on government and private borrowing ·from the banking system. 
From the bank's balance sheets, the change in foreign reserves "must" be 
determined as a residual item. Or, in other words , if domestic borrowing 
from the banking system is restricted, the balance of payments will 
impr ove. 
The new structuralists argued that monetary and credit contraction, 
espoused by monetarists as a key policy for control l ing inflation and 
improving t he balance of payment, will increase the cost of financing 
working capital needs. This has an immediate short-run stagflationary 
impact coming from the supply side of the economy causing a heavy and 
costly recession before price inflation can be brought down. 
Theoretical case for the new structuralists 
New structuralist models specify Keynesian adjustment mechanisms. 
The market-determined nominal interest rate is the curb or noninstitu-
tional credit market adjusts to equate demand for and supply of money and 
credit. Income adjusts to equilibrate demand and supply in the goods 
market . Structuralist models incorporate the effect for the curb markets 
in developing countries. They view these markets as competitive and 
agile (Taylor, 1983). Reserve requirements constitute a leakage in t he 
process of financial intermediation through commercial banks. For this 
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reason new structuralists claim that banks cannot intermediate as 
efficiently as curb markets between savers and investors . All new 
structuralist models use Tobin's portfolio framework for household sector 
asset allocation . Households face t hree categories of assets--gold or 
currency, bank depos i ts, and curb market loans. Taylor (1983 ) and 
VanWijnbergen (1982) point out that whether higher deposit rates do 
increase the total supply of credit depends on the required reserve ratio 
and on whether the increased holding of real money balances come mainly 
at the expense of inflation hedges or mainly from direct lending in the 
curb market (Fry, 1982). Edward Buffie (1984), Akira Kohsaka ( 1984), 
Taylor and VanWijnbergen conclude that, in practice , financial liberal i -
zation is likely to reduce the rate of economic growth by reducing the 
total real supply of credit available to business firms. The new 
structuralists assume that funds flow freely between the banking system 
and the curb market savers and investors can generally use either or both 
markets, at least to some extent. Hence, the rel evant interest rate in 
structuralist models is the curb market rate because it represents the 
marginal cost of borrowing on one hand , since curb market loans con-
stitute an alternative to holding money balances. 
Any increase in the curb market rate raises the price level because 
a rise in the curb market rate increases the cost of making capital; 
prices are determined by fixed markups over costs in all new struc-
turalist models. A rise i n the curb market rate also reduces output by 
deterring investment. An increase in the deposit rate of interest may 
raise the curb market rate and so depress growth if it reduces the total 
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supply of working capital--working capital supplied by both the banking 
system and the curb market. 
Commercial banks are subject to a fixed r equired reserve ratio 1-q, 
and the central bank does not extend credit to the private sector. The 
cash base (reserve money or high-powered money) is , therefore, entirely 
outside money. The household sector holds three assets: currency or 
gold , bank deposits , and curb market l oans . An increa se in the deposit 
rate of interest raises demand for deposit and reduces demand f or 
currency a nd curb market loans . If substitution of deposit for curb 
market loans is more important than substitution of deposi ts for currency 
holdings , the total supply of working capital can fall and the curb 
market interest rate can rise (VanWi jnbergen, 1983). The same conclusion 
is r eached by Buffie (1984), "Once we allow for repercussions in the curb 
market , financial liberalization becomes a pe rilous undertaking. " 
The Supply Response Mechanism 
The complete description, the supply response mechanism to monetarv 
contraction goes in the following manner. 
In a relatively underdeveloped system of financial intermediation, 
the stock marke t plays a limited role, i f a ny at all. Accordingly. banks 
play a muc h more predominant r ole t han they do in Europe or the Uni ted 
Stat ed as a source of funds for firms , both for short - term working 
capital purposes and for long-term fixed capi tal formation. The fact 
that working capital is nearl y entirely financed via credit makes the 
business sector in LDCs very vulnerable to adverse credit conditions. 
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Bank credit is often severely rationed, with bank lending rates 
unresponsive to excess demand for credit. This is, of course, one of the 
main reasons why "curb markets," play such a large role in many coun-
tries. Via these markets the public can lend directly to firms bypassing 
the banking system. 
Much more important here in the short-run , however, is the transmis-
sion channel between monetary instruments and the supply side of the 
economy via credit financing of working capital needs. Working capital 
i s needed to finance stocks of raw materials, semi-finished goods, 
intermediate imports , advanced payments to workers, etc. Typically, 
working capital needs are financed by banks or curb market credit. This 
i mpli~s that the cost of credit (the real interest rate) is a component 
of input costs. Markup pricing rules will , therefore, lead to an 
immediate cost push effect of high interest rates (the curb market rate 
is usually the relevant rate to look at) on prices. Also , under monopol -
istic market structures, a high cost of credit will not only lead to a 
short -run cost push effect on prices, but lead t o a reduction in real 
output as real input costs have gone up. 
This transmission channel, from tight limits on bank credit via the 
curb market and high costs of financing working capital into the supply 
side of the economy gives a stagflationary bias to tight monetary 
policies. Basically , what is going on is that this transmission channel 
adds an adverse supply shock aspect to policies of monetary restraint on 
top of more traditional demand reduc ing effects. Tight money policies 
lead to expensive credit which leads to increase the component of input 
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costs . This in turn leads to more inflation and less output then would 
obtain without this transmission mechanism present . Tight money policies 
pushes firms into the curb market, drives up interest rates there , and so 
initiates the stagflationary effects mentioned above. 
Nearly all bank credit and certainly all curb market credit , has a 
ve ry short maturity. This implies that the stagflationary impact of a 
credit crunch via the credit-working capital link will work itself 
through the system quickly, say within one or two quarters . The demand 
restraining impact , however, typically works only gradually: first 
aggregate demand (investment) will fall, which over time will increase 
unempl oyment. This in turn will, after further lags,ease real wage 
pressure and, thus, inflation. A typical response to a one -shot tighten-
ing up of monetary policy would , therefore, be an initial accelerati on of 
inflation rate , after which demand effects take over, effecting a slow 
down of the rate. Both effects have a negative impact on output . 
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CHAPTER III . THE MODEL 
In this section, the basic mod el used to test the new structuralist 
hypothesis in Sudan will be described. This model is the same (with few 
modifications ) as the one used by Joseph Lim (1987), a number of other 
models seem to have input in Lim's model . These include , for exampl e, 
Bruno (1979), VanWijnbergen (1982), Buffie (1983, 1984), and Taylor 
( 1983) to mention some of them. 
The Assumptions of the Model 
The model is based on four assumptions. these assumptions actuall y 
hold for a ll new structuralist models (M. J. Fry, 1988). These assump-
tions are: 
1. Wages are determined institutionally or exogenously through class 
conflict. 
2. Savings takes place out of profits, not wages. 
3 . The price level is determined by fixed markups over cost of labor. 
imports, and working capital financ e ( the interest rate ) . 
4. There is a critical need for imports of raw materials , capital 
equipment. and intermediate goods. Assumptions ( 3 ) and (4 ) impl y 
that the restrictive monetary policy that raises interest rates can 
produce stagflation --an acceleration in the inflation rate and a 
reduction in the rate of economic growth at the same time. 
• 
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The Sudanese Conditions 
The first assumption is rationalized based on that for example the 
agricultural sector which employs about 707. of the l a bor force suffers 
from labor shortage. The main reason behind this is believed to be wage 
incentive (World Bank , 1985). It is also true that the general wage 
level is not fully indexed to price increases in Sudan . 
The second assumption is justified in that, in Sudan, savings appear 
to come mainly from firms and farmers who are engaged in production 
rather than from wage earners. There is , however, no empirical support 
for this observation (The World Bank , 1985) . 
Mark -up pricing is justified based on the f indings that ( i) Sudan's 
commercial and foreign exchange policies are biased against exportables 
in favor of nontradeables and import competing industries (Elbadawi, 
1987), (ii) real prices of home goods and nonagricultural tradeables 
stayed constant over time (Hassan, 1989 ), and (iii) the coexistence of 
price control and black market ( World Bank, 1985 ) . Given these results 
mark-up pricing is assumed to hold for nonagricultural tradeables and 
home goods . 
Finally, the existence of critical needs for imports of raw mate-
rials , capital equipment, and intermediate goods for both agriculture and 
domestic industry has already been mentioned in Chapter I. 
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The Model 
This model will include both monetarist and new-structuralist 
hypotheses. We test this on Sudan with annual data from 1970-1986. We 
a ssume a one - sector economy. The production function is neo-classical 
and output is assumed to have three inputs (1) labor , (2) capital stoc k , 
and (3) imported raw materials and imported intermediate inputs. The 
capital stock is assumed to be fixed in the short-run. 
Aggregate supply--the output function 
The supply function of domestically produced goods is dependent on 
capital stock as well as the r eal costs of the variable factor inputs 
(wages and domestic price of imported raw materials and intermediate 
inputs) inclusive of the real cost of borrowings at the interest rate for 
marginal funds ( i.e ., the curb or parallel market rater ) . This 
c 
function is the result of profit maximization and yields. 
* s(- e - e Q w( l+r -~ ), eP ( l+r - ~ ) , k) 
c m c 
where : 
Q5 ~ level of output 
-w real wage rate 
r parallel or curb market r ate c 
e ~ expected pri ce inflation 
e real exchange rate 
* P world price of imported inputs m 
k - level of capital stock 
(3.1) 
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To obtain (3.1) in the profit - maximization process, we should recall 
that labor supply (L) and inter mediate input requirements (R) are 
functions of t he same right-hand variables in (3.1), i.e. , 
- e L ~ L(w(l+r -~ ), 
c 
R - e R( w( l+r - ~ ) , 
c 
-* e eP (l+r -~ ), k ) m c 
-* e eP (l+r - ~ ) , k) 
m c 
(3 . 2) 
(3.3) 
Qs in (3 . 1 ) is the gross output inclusive of the value of imported 
inputs. Our usual value added or real GNP , y (a t ilde denote s t hat the 
value is in real terms ), which nets out the value of imported inputs , 
should have the same form of equation ( 3.1 ) or 
- - - e -* e y = y( w(l+r - ~ ), e P (l+r -~ ), k ) c m c (3.4) 
Output , y, is assumed to depend on the size of the existing r eal 
capital stock , k , (fixed in the short r~n ) a nd the amounts employed of 
* 
t he variable factor (w. eP ) while the stock of real capital i s given at 
m 
any moment in time , employment of the variable factor will depend on its 
price ( including the real cost of borrowings at the interest rate for 
marginal funds, i.e. , curb market rate, r ) relative to the price of the 
c 
final product and the financial possibilities o pe n to the firm. It is 
assumed that, at the prevailing prices of inputs and outputs, firms would 
be willing to expa nd produc tion but are effectively cons trained in their 
utilization of the variable factor by t he availability and the cost of 
financial working capital. This is believed to be true even where 
current production is fi nanced through t he accumulation of past profits 
or o r iginal capital endowments of the firm . High real interest rates or 
in our case quantitative limitations on the availabili t y of credit for 
working capital could lead to reduced l evels of inventories , which then 
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limit the ability of the firm to produce and supply final goods and , of 
course , lead to higher costs of production. Shortages in working capital 
may also be reflected in a cutback in hiring. Availability and cost of 
financial working capital is also assumed to be crucial for small - scale 
farming (Keller, 1980). Farmers producing cash crops as mentioned before 
depend on credit from money lenders (for hiring of labor in case of 
publicly owned irrigation schemes), where available, on bank credit for 
their working capital needs for the rest of the sector to cover the 
necessities of life and the cost of seeds and the other inputs during the 
time preceding the harvest and sale of agricultural produce. The same 
assumptions are applied to the whole economy where the final output is 
the total use of the final goods and the total imports of goods and 
service from abroad. 
Estimation of the curb market rate 
Curb market rate is unobservable, however, we assume that it can be 
predicted using observable variables. Asset holders are assumed to 
divide their assets among demand deposits , time-savings deposits, curb 
market loans, foreign assets, commodity stock. housing, and currency. 
The level of curb market loans, therefore. would depend on the rate 
of return of these assets, i.e. , curb market, expected depreciation in 
the black market rate, expected i nflat ion rate ( we) as well as real 
income y--interest rates on time and savings deposits will be ignored 
here because of its empirical irrelevance (Dornawitz and Elbadawi, 1987) 
and because it does not reflect the true opportuni ty cost of holding 
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money due to the redundancy of the assets market in Sudan ( R.M . Hassan , 
1989). 
Because of the financial regulation on the ba nking sector credi t 
market does not clear , it is the curb market rate that freely fluctuates 
to equate the supply of curb-market lenders and the curb market demand of 
the credit rat ioned firms. Firms work i ng capital needs are financed by 
bank loans and , since the re is credit- rationing, curb ma r ket loans. 
Thus, the curb market rate would be determined by the following: 
LOb ~ r eal bank loans available. The more ba nk l oans are made 
available , the less the demand for curb market loans, leading curb market 
interest to fall. 
e ~ = expected i nflation rate . A higher expected inflation rate 
reduces the r eal return and curb market loans and so d ivert s funds out of 
curb market loans into other assets where values do not deteriorate with 
price inflation ( such as commodity stock and housing or foreign assets ). 
This has an upward push on the curb market rate. 
b 
E - The rate of depreciation in the black market exchange rate is 
positively related to t he curb market rate or people will make sure that 
their curb lending rate or transactions accoun t for the loss of value of 
the local currency. Eb is defined here as: Eb = log EBt - log EBt-l ' 
where EB = black market exchange rate . 
- -* wL+eP R - working capital needs. The higher the working capital m 
needs. the greater the demand for curb market loans, so the higher the 
curb market rate. 
y - real income . The higher t he income, the higher will be both the 
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demand a nd supply of curb l oans . Also how an increase i n income (and, 
the r efore, savings) wil l affect the asset portfolio choice will depend on 
the parameters relating the various assets to income. 
r , therefore , can be written as a function of observable variables, 
c 
as i n (3 . 5). 
r 
c 
* - - - Eb) w, ePm, R. y, 
+ + + ? + 
(3.5) 
But using equations (3 . 2), (3.3), and (3.4) reduces equation ( 3.5) 
to 
Ihe 
* 
f(Lob, e - eP - Eb, k ) r ?r w, 
m' y, c 
+ + + ? + + 
S!.!121'.;!l:t: function 
Substituting (3.6) into (3.1) and (3.4) yields 
Qs - Qs(w, e~ ' LOb, ?re Eb. k ) 
m 
+ + + 
* 
y - y(w, ePm' Lob , ?re Eb , k ) 
+ + + 
(3 .6) 
(3.7) 
(3. 8 ) 
We, therefore, have a semi-reduced form for our supply function . Now 
aggrega te supply should equal aggregate demand and price fluctuates to 
achieve this. Thus , we have 
s -Q ( w, * e P , 
m 
Aggregate demand 
(3. 9 ) 
Aggregate demand is composed of consumption demand for domesti cally 
produced goods, investment demand for domestically produced goods , 
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government expenditure and export demand . Government expenditure is 
assumed to be determined exogenously. Export demand is also assumed to 
be determined outside this model. 
Consumption demand for domestical l y produced goods is assumed to be 
dependent on total resources mobilized in the economy net of capital 
flight. This is based on the following accounting identities: 
Resource Mobilization = M - Y + B + R (3.10) 
Resource use ~ E = C + I + F + K (3.11) 
where Y, B, and R are GDP, current account balance or net borrowing, and 
net current transfers or remittances including official and black market, 
respectively. C, I , F, and Kare consumption, investment, net factor 
service payments , and capital flight, respectively. The basic principle 
behind the use of (3 .10 ) is the identity be tween mobilized resources and 
their use . Thus, we have (The World Bank , 1985; Ali , 1987 ) 
M - E (3. 12) 
Due to the unavailability of accurate data on remittance s and capital 
flight and since testing the new structuralist hypothesis does not 
require a direct estimation of t he marginal propensity to consume , I will 
use the marginal propensity to consume estimated by Ali (1987) for seven 
years as 
C = 84 + .8396 (M - k) (3. 13) 
(2 14) 
( Figure between brackets is t ratio.) to generate M - k, which will be 
used l ater in the inves tment and price inflation equations. 
Public sector investment demand i s assumed to be exogenous, private 
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sector investment demand is endogenous and assumed to be affected by 
resources mobilized , the flow of real credit forthcoming from the banking 
system. The idea behind this is that firms will try to get whatever bank 
financing they can get, as it is offered at below-market clearing rates. 
This in t urn makes rationing necessary, which expl ains why the quantity 
and not the price variable (real bank lending rate) is of relevance 
(VanWijnbergen, 1982; Blejer & Khan, 1984; Fry, 1988 ). For the parts of 
planned investment not covered by bank loans firms will have to decide 
whether to go to the curb market or not to undertake the project in-
volved. For this the real curb-market rate is of relevance, not hampered 
by regulations , clears the credit market . Private investment is also 
assumed to be affected by public investment (Blejer and Khan, 1984 ; and 
the references mentioned therein) although there is a considerable 
uncertainty about whether, on balance , public sector investment raises or 
lowers private investment. In broad terms , public sector investment can 
cause corwding out if it utilizes scarce physical and financial resources 
that would otherwise be available to the private sector , or if it 
produces marketable output that competes with private output. Yet, 
public investment that is related to infrastructure and provision of 
public goods can also clearly be complementary to private investment. 
This type of investment can enhance the possibilities for private 
investment and raise the productivity of capital increase the demand for 
private output through increased demand for inputs and services . and 
augment overall resources availability by expanding aggregate output and 
savings. The overall effect then depends on the relative strength of 
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these factors a nd there is no reason to believe that they are necessarily 
substitutes or complements. The investment demand function for the 
private sector will be written as 
-
IG) (3.14) 
? + ? 
where • 
M-k real resources mobilized as defined in (3.10, 3.11). 
LOb = real bank loans available 
c 
r curb market rate as defined in (3.6) 
GI real public investment 
Knowing that re is assumed to be influenced by LOb then equation (3.14) 
can be written as 
- c -
I - I(M : k , r IG) 
? ? 
or 
* I(M:k, - L.ob e Eb -I w, eP m' 1f ' k, IG) ? + + + ? 
The price inflation function 
Equation (3.9) can , therefore, be rewritten as 
* s - - p 1- 0 b. e Q (w, e , 1f 
m 
- - - -
e 
1f ' 
where C, I, G and E denote real consumption demand for domestically 
(3 .15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
produced goods, real investment demand real government expenditure and 
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real export demand , respectively. w refers to the proportion of total 
investments that is spent on domestically produced goods. It is assumed 
to be fairly constant and stable. A further assumption is that govern-
ment consumption expenditure has very little impor t ed content. 
The price level is assumed to fluctuate to achieve the equilibrium 
described in (3.12) . (The equilibrium is assumed to hold when savings 
equal investment and the aggregate excess demand in the economy is equal 
to zero. The basic assumptions here are that any increase in investment 
will create excess demand for output that can only be reduced by rising 
price level and mark-up rate. Given that nominal wage is assumed to be 
fixed, real wage will fall. Since savings a r e assumed to come from 
producers and profit earners as opposed to labor, the marginal propensity 
to consume is higher for the latter. The reduction in real wage, then . 
will r educe consumption, increase savings , and drive the excess demand 
back t o zero. The investment-saving balance is equivalent t o Walras's 
Law. ) ( For further details see Taylor, 1983). If we further assume that 
it takes one year for prices to adjust to supply and demand c ha nges . t his 
results in a semi-reduced form f or the price inflation, whic h is 
-p f ( w. eP m + + 
(3.18) 
A hat denotes a growth r ate while d denotes first differences. We 
use the first difference for the expected inflation , foreign interest 
rate and the rate of de precia t ion in the black market exchange rate 
instead of growth rates. I t- l/kt - l is the var iable used to measure the 
growt h r ate in capital stock. 
46 
Monetary Contraction Effect on Supply and Demand 
* 
The changes in w, eP I and Eb have positive effects on price infla -
m 
tion since a rise in these variables would lead to expected contractions 
in aggr egate supply. However, they have negative effects on inflation 
since they reduce aggregate demand mainly via investment demand . 
Similarly bank loans (LOb) and expected inflation may affect prices 
negatively since they are expected to increase aggregate supply; but at 
the same time, they would have a positive effect since they will give an 
upward push to aggregate demand via investments. Herein lies the problem 
of this study. Monetary and credit contraction ( l ower LOb and higher Eb ) 
will have a positive effect on prices via the working capital cost push 
on aggregate supply, while at the same time exerting a negative one via 
the standard monetarist effect on aggregate demand. Simple regression 
will be used here to determine which effect is stronger in the short run . 
The Data Base 
The sample period covered for this study is 1970 to 1986, for lagged 
variables it is extended back to 1961. The variables required for this 
study are: (1) income, (2) wage rate, (3) real effective exchange rate , 
(4) banking claims on the private sector, (5) price l evel . (6) invest -
ment, (7) black market exchange rate , (8) consumption. (9) demand 
deposits, (10) time deposits, fll) exports, (12) government expenditure. 
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D.l Income 
The income variable used in this study is the Sudanese gross 
domestic product series, GDP, which is based on the national income 
accounts. There are some well-known problems with such series. These 
are due to changes in methodology used to assemble the accounting data , 
and to potentially large errors in the survey data. Nevertheless, these 
are the best income data available at this time and are obtained from the 
IMF Internat i onal Financial Statistics. (Note that reported GDP and 
unreported GDP move together which means the former captures all varia -
tions in latter and that excluding the latter in this study does not 
change the results.) 
D.2 Wage 
The wage data is obtained per man days for the labor in the public 
irrigated schemes and the traditional rain-fed subsector as a proxy for 
the wage rate per man day in the agricultural sector , wage per man day is 
also obtained for the nonagricultural, tradable , and the home good 
sectors. A weighted average wage rate by area cultivated is constructed 
for the agricultural sector. A weighted overall average wage rate is 
constructed according to the percentage of labor force in each sector. 
Basic data is obtained from R. M. Hassan ( 1989 ) . Weights are obtained 
from the World Bank (1985 ) . 
D.3 Real effective exchange rate 
It was computed as a weighted sum of the exchange rate multiplied by 
wholesale price indexes (WPis ) for Sudan's major t rading partners , 
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divided by the Sudan's consumer price index (CPI). J. Lim (1987) used 
the domestic cost of all imports to measure the domestic cost of inputs. 
The CPI is used as a proxy for the price of nontradables . The partners 
(and weights) are: Egypt (.03), Saudi Arabia and rest of the Middle East 
(.32), USA (.06), West Germany (.11), France (.06), UK ( . 12 ), Italy 
( .10), India (.06), Japan (.09), Romania (.01), and Yugoslavia (.04). 
The source of the real effective exchange rate is Elbadawi (1988). 
D.4 Monetary variable 
This is the commercial banks' claims on the private sector and is 
obtained from the IFS . 
D.5 Prices 
The only price data available is the Sudanese consumer price i ndex , 
obtained from the Bank of Sudan annual report and the IFS. The CPI is 
based on a 1968 basket of goods for salaried employees in Khartoum , and 
it includes a number of commodities which are subsidized or subjected to 
price ceilings. Direct subsidies of key items such as sugar , wheat, 
petrol and cooking oil , as well as excess demand. fueled black market 
activity. Black market prices may have exceeded "official" prices by as 
much as 69% in 19 75. This implies that our estimates of price and 
inflation impacts may be underestimating the actual effects. 
D.6 Investment 
Investment data is obtained as a total investment of the private and 
public sectors in the agricultural , nonagricultural tradable and home 
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good sectors. Capital stock is approximated by aggreg~ting real invest-
ment over time investment data is obtained from R. M. Hassan (1989). 
D.7 Black market exchange rate 
The black market exchange rate data is obtained from various issues 
of the world currency year book. 
• 
0.8 Consumption 
Data on consumption is obtained from the IFS, the World Bank (1985 ) 
and R. M. Hassan ( 1989). 
0.9 Export 
Data on export is obtained from the IFS. 
0.10 Government expenditure 
Government expenditure data is obtained from IFS and the Ministry of 
Finance economic surveys various issues . 
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CHAPTER IV. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION 
This part deals with estimation issues. It s tarts with modelling 
the expected inflation function and goes through output and private 
investment demand equations to the price inflation equation which 
concludes this part . 
Econometric Estimation 
h d . . fl . (-el T e expecte pric e 1nation equation - " 
Expected inflation is assumed to be consis t ent with the "rational 
expectat i ons" and that economic agents do possess ful l information about 
the structure of the model described in Chapter III . Inflation is 
defined here as 
where 
and 
where 
or 
Pt - CPI , consumer price index 
e 
11" 
t 
it - error 
That is expectations are unbiased. i.e., there is no systemati c com-
(4 .1 ) 
( 4.2) 
(4. 3) 
ponen t in the forecast error . it is assumed to be normally distributed 
and should not be correlated wi t h the information set that is avail abl e 
to the forecaster at the time the prediction is made. If we denote xt-l 
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t he i nformation avail able at time (t-1) and write 
e 
~t = ~ t + (t (4.4) 
e e then~ t depends on xt-l and ~ t is not correlated with ft. This implies 
that 
and that 
e var(~ ) ~ var(~ ) 
t t 
Any correlation between ft and any variables in xt-l imply that not al l 
the available information has been used . Taking mathemati cal expecta -
tions of all the variables in (4.4) we get 
(4.5) 
The l eft hand side of (4.5) is interpreted as the subjective expectation 
a nd the right hand side of (4.5) is the objecti ve expectation conditional 
on the data available when t he expectations were formed. Thus, there is 
a connec t ion between the subjective beliefs of economic agents and the 
actual behavior of the economic system. 
Economic theory might not be very valuable in generating an accurate 
model of expectations formation because it i s difficult on t heoretical 
grounds to exclude any piece of information avai l able at time (t -1 ) as a 
useful predic tor of a n economi c variabl e and thus from the x-vector 
( Mishkin , 1982). This suggests that a t heoretical statistical procedure 
might be superior to economic theory for deciding on the expected 
inflation equation. Expected inflation is assumed to depend on a 
multivar iate t ime series of its own l agged values and a wide range of 
other macro variables, i .e., 
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4 4 4 
~ t - a + a. L ~ + a. L G + ak L Y + ut 
0 
i i=l t-i Jj-1 t-j+l -K-1 t-k 
(4.6) 
where 
~i' s - l agged values of inflation , 
G ., - curr ent and lagged values of the rate of growth of nominal 
J s 
government expenditure, 
Yk's ~lagged values of the rate of growth nominal income. 
ut is a zero mean , normally distributed, serially uncorrelated 
random process. 
OLS es t imation of this equat i on gives a consistent estimate of the a's . 
The growth rate is used to account for the nonstationarity of these 
variables. Other variables like money s upply and export growth rates 
were also tested and excluded on the basis of t heir statistical insig-
nificance. The results of estimating equation (4.6) ar e: 
e ~t = .094 + 
.113 
( .842) 
.753~ 1 + .0322~ 2 - .19~ 3 + .464~ 4 
.224 t- .236 t- .202t- .191 t -
(3.087)** (. 137) (-.941) (2.437)* 
- .312G + .383G l - .546G 2 + .257Gt_ 3 + .049Yt-l .148 t . 109 t- .129 t- .137 .165 
( - 2. 114)* (3.53)** ( -4 . 229)*** (l.891) ( . 298) 
+ .023Y 2 - .423Yt_ 3 + .269Y 4 .183 t- .198 .187 t-
(. 123) ( - 2.141)* (1.439) 
(4.6) ' 
2 
R ~ .928, F - 6.445**· DW ~ 3.246, DF = 18 of t he e rror (Figures in 
brackets are t-statistics). The statistical significance of the coef-
ficients in each equation estimated here was established by t-tests with 
n-k degrees of freedom by testing the hypothesis: 
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HA: negation 
where n is the number of observations, k the numbe r of regressors, and a. 
1 
is the coefficient of a given regressor. The significance of complete 
regressions on the otherhand was established by testing the hypothesis: 
HA : negation 
where 
fi's the joint coefficients of the regression 
The F test was the n used as: 
F = (k, n-k-1) 2 
(1 -R )/( n-k-1) 
where n and k are as defined before and R2 is the multiple correlation 
coefficient. Statistically significant coefficients are marked with 
asterisks in each equation, where one, two , and three asterisks denote 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively . Multicolinearity as measured by 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) is no t a problem for equation (4.6). 
Autocorrelation in the presence of lagged dependent variabl es in the r-
h-s can be tested using h-test . 
where 
h 
P = estimated first order serial correlation 
v(a) - estimated variance of OLS estimate of a 
t 
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n - the sample size . 
If n~(~) > 1 the test is not applicable whi~h appeared to be the case 
here. So autocorrelation is tes t ed by regressing the residuals from 
(4 .6) ' on its lagged values u 
1 
and the other explanatory variabl es in 
t-
the model and then testing the coefficient of 
. 
The result of u t-1· 
fitting the described equation is : 
4 4 4 . 
.08 . 829 
. . 
L 
. z: G + . L yk + i;- t ut - - ut-1 + a . 7r + a. ak l. 1 J . 1 t +l- j k=l 1- t-i J-
(. 841 ) ( - 2 .736 ) 
The es timated coeffi cient of u 1 is statisticall y not significant at l 'l. t-
level. The plot of residuals against the fitted values of t he dependent 
variable from equat i on ( 4.6 ) ' showed no definite pattern in the magnitude 
of dispe r s i on about zero, so t he variance of the residuals is assumed to 
be homogenious (Figure 4.1). The normal probability plot of r esidual s on 
t he othe r hand appeared as straight line, however , there are t wo ou tliers 
(Figure 4.2). This may cast some doubts in the functional form or the 
data. ne ve rtheless expected inflation from equation ( 4.6) ' will be used 
in our model equations. 
Because the sampl e period is small (1968- 1986) which limits the 
flexibility of the used functional form , I decided to estimate another 
equation for .,,. t with fewer numbe r of explanatory variables a nd t r y both 
of them in t he model equations. All t he macro va riables men tioned before 
we r e again included with the constraint that the maximum number of 
explanatory variables is e i ght , the best specification c hosen is t he one 
with the highest R
2 
and significant F and t s ta tistics. 
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The best specification generated f rom this trial was the following 
estimated equation . 
,.. 
e 
7f t - .161 + 
.067 
(2.427)** 
. 289 7ft-l + .365 7f t-2 + .0182 7f t-3 + .258 7f 4 
.226 .219 . 236 .229 t-
(1.279) (1.668) (.077) (1.127) 
- .278 Gt - .215 Gt-l - .404 G 2 . 138 . 107· . 136 t-
( -2. 019)* (2.003)* ( - 2.97)** 
2 
R - .744. F - 4 . 556**, OW= 2.056 , OF - 18 
(4.7) 
Again, VIF showed no multicolinea ri ty problem here. Autocorrelation is 
tested the same way as in equat ion (4.6) ' and for the same reasons. 
The result of fitting the residuals of equation (4.7) is as follows: 
4 A 3 ,. . 
-.003631 .0551 
. 
+ E a. + t Q. G + µt µt - µt-1 7f t-i 
i=l 
l. 
j-1 J t +l- j 
(-.06) ( - . 207) 
The estimated coefficient of u 
1 
is clearly not significant at 10% 
t -
level. The plot of residuals against the fitted values of the dependent 
variable plus the normal probability plot of the residuals from equa tion 
(4.7) (see Figures 4.3 and 4 .4) indicate t hat expected inflation gener-
ated by equation (4.6) ' is better; however , both results will be inter-
preted with caution , and a third measure for expected inflation will be 
added . Both equations show that private economic agents form their 
expectations a bout in£lation on the basis of previous experience of 
inflation. present and previous experience of government expenditure 
growth rate and, for equation (4.6)' , previous experience of income 
growth rate. The lag length is determi ned mainly on the basis of 
standard econometric principles and was limi ted by the degrees of 
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freedom. This method of estimating the expected inflation is called the 
i nstrumental variable method because the predetermined variables are used 
as the appr opriate instruments which are not correlated wit h t he e rror as 
described in equation (4. 4 ). The predicted values of ~t - l ~twill then 
be used as the expected inflation to estimate the rest of the model 
equations namel y out~ut, investment , and prices equations. 
The real output eguation 
Because of the endogeneity of the real bank loans to the private 
s ector varia bl e in the right hand side of equation ( 3 .8), the output 
equation . the (2SLS) is used to generate predicted values of LObt as LObt 
b 
as a function of its own real lagged values LO 
1 
and t he other pre -
t-
determined variables in the model. namely the real gove rnment expenditure 
and the r ea l export. The existence of the simultaneity bias viol ate the 
crucial assumption we make for (OLS ) estimation, that is t he explanator y 
variables are independen t of the error term u . By regressing LOt on 
pr ede termined variabl es which are hopefully uncorrelated with the e rror 
-
term but correlated with the expl anatory variables in the equation t he LO 
will be uncorrelated with u. 
- b 
The regression of y on LO and t he other explanatory variables in 
the model then generates a consistent estimator of LOb coefficient . The 
result of fit ting the bank loa n equation i s 
L-ob 4 s 6 - b -t - -. 6 + . 51 LO t-l + .019 Et+ .757 G + ut 
( -3 . 129) (5.67) (.233) ( 3 . 43 ) 
2 
R = . 926. OF - 16 
where 
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LOb = lagged real bank loan . 
t-1 
Et - real export. 
G - real government expenditure. 
- b 
The predicted values LO t's are then used in the estimation of the 
real output equation. A dummy variable is also included to account for 
the drought of 1984. Three different estimates of inflation will be 
tested in the output equation first expected inflation as generated by 
(4 .6 ) ' and second as generated by (4.7) and, finally, the measured rate 
of inflation as defined in (4.1) will also be tested. The rational e for 
using measured inflation is that rational expectations imply that 
measured inflation equals expected inflation. All the equations were 
estimated in the log linear form (Cobb Douglas function). The results of 
fitting the different specifications are reported in Table 4 . 1. 
where 
~ = measured inflation 
e ~ expected inflation as generated by (4 . 6) ' 
. e 
~ expected inflation as genera ted by (4.7). 
The results of estimating the real output equation as shown in Table 
4 . 1 s hows that the monetary-related variables do affect supply equation. 
In particular, the real bank loans variable have significant positive 
impact in al l the equations. The rate of depreciation in the black 
market exchange rate has a negative impact on the output equation and is 
statistically significant at 10% l evel in equation (1 ) Table 4.1. For 
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Table 4.1. Output equation 
1 2 3 
intercept 3.976 4.084 4 .173 
.52 .558 . 624 
(7. 649 )*** (7. 313)*** (6.683)*** 
fob 0.367 0.413 0.475 
. 144 .152 .184 ... (2.543)** (2 . 721 )** (2 .581 )** 
- 0.363 w 0.374 0.381 
. 062 .066 .076 
(5.888)*** ( 5. 627)*** (5.05)*** 
D - 0.109 -0 . 115 -0.33 
.057 .062 .07 
(-1.893)* (-1. 845 )* ( -2. 387)** 
* 
eP -0.295 -0.313 -0.128 m 
.114 . 123 .138 
( - 2.574)** (-2.533)** (-1.735) 
Eb -0.106 -0.104 -0.128 
.058 .064 . 071 
( -1. 828)* (-1.632) ( -1.791) 
11' -0.482 
.229 
( -2.101)* 
e 
-0 .418 11' 
. 272 
(- 1. 538) 
-e 
-0 . 034 11' 
.454 
(-0.076) 
K 0.131 0.121 0.084 
.044 .048 . 073 
( 2 . 972 )** (2.516 )** ( 1.14 7) 
R2 0.9219 0.9079 0.8837 
F 15*** 12.667*** 9.769*** 
DW 1. 997 2 .11 l. 924 
DF 16 16 16 
t statistics same as in equation ( 4. 6), . 
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the rest of the equations , however, it is significant at only 207. level. 
The expected inflation variables have a negative impact on the output 
function and significant at 207. using the predicted values of equation 
(4. 6)'. Measured inflation on the other hand, also has a negative impact 
and statistically significant at 107. level . The negative sign of the 
expected inflation e<>uld be due to that curb market lender adjust their 
lending rates immediately and fully in response to any expected increase 
in inflation . This, in turn , prevents curb market borrowers from receiv-
ing l oans at a lower real rate and, thus , the effect of expected infla-
tion or inflation is transmitted immediately to highe r curb rates and 
l ower output. The other intermediate input variables, the real wage rate 
and imported intermediate input variables are statistically significant 
and have positive and negative impact on output , r espectivel y. For the 
real wage rate this goes against our initial hypothesis and could be 
explained by that labor shortage is , in fact , one of the major rigidities 
in the agricultural sector. The demand for labor may exceed supply at 
the existing wage rates prevailing in the different schemes. This is due 
to the declining real wage rates for cotton picking and other physically 
hard manual tasks in agriculture, a decline due in large part to the 
decline i n real returns t o cotton growers until 1983/ 84. The experience 
of 1984 in Gez ira indicates that when wage rates for cotton picking are 
raised, the necessary labor does , in fact , become available. It is also 
true that in this case real wages per unit of effort tend to fall when 
y i elds are l ow and t end to rise when yields are high even for the same 
piece of work rate (The World Bank, 1985). 
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The aggregate investment variable which is used as a proxy for 
capital stock has a significant positive effect in two of the equations, 
however , it has created multicolinearity problem as indicated by the 
(VIF). The multiple correlation coefficient between the capital stock 
variable and the rest of the explanatory variables using measured 
inflation, however , ~s less than that of equation 1 (R2=.9187). It is 
also true that the estimated coefficients are not sensitive to small 
variations in the data . Based on this we can conclude that multi-
colinearity is not a serious problem , and we can r ely on conclusions 
drawn from equation 1. I must mention here that, for convenience , the 
output equation was estimated with the real lending bank rate included 
and the result was a serious multicolinearity and an insignificant t 
ratio for t he lending rate variable so it will be dropped for the rest of 
the equations. 
The private sector real investment demand equations 
Private investment demand is assumed to depend on resources mobil-
ized, to generate the latter as described in equation (3.13). The 
procedure is simpl y as follows: 
Assume the following estimated consumption function 
G ~ a + MPG * (M - K) 
Then predict (M - K), (M - K) = (C - a)/ MPC 
where 
. 
C, a, MPG are consumption. estimated intercept and marginal propen-
sity to consume, respectively. Consumption . however, is endogenous so 
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i nstead we used predicted consumption from the regression of consumption 
on other exogenous variables in the model , G and E. (M : K) was then 
used to estimate equation (3.11). Expected inflation as defined by (4.7) 
was dropped due to i ts poor performance in the ou t put equation. The 
results of estimations are reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 , where both 
e xpected and measured inflati on included separately and different 
s pecificati ons were t r ied. 
The result of es timating the private investment demand function 
showed that there was a serious multicolinearity problem based on the 
(VIF) which i s well above 10 for capital stock, wage rate , resources 
mobilized and real bank loan variables us i ng both definitions of infl a-
tion (equation s 1 , Tables 4.2 and 4. 3). Gi ven the low t ratio of s ome of 
the variables then, they were jointl y and sequentially excluded from the 
investment equa t ion on the basis of R2 and the F test. The hypothesis to 
be tes ted is the linear restriction of the form: 
# = # = 1 2 
HA negation 
- # k 
where #1 , #2 •... $k are the joint coeffici ents of the variables to be 
excluded. 
where 
The F test was then used as 
F(J , n-k ) 
(R2 - R2*) / J 
2 
( 1 - R )/(n-J) 
R
2* = the mult ipl e correlation coefficient of the restricted model. 
J =the number of restrictions and R
2
, n as defined before. 
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Table 4.2. Investment with measured inflation rate 
1 2 3 4 
intercept 14.804 17.478 21. 002 18 .13 
7.056 6 . 366 4 . 354 2. 714 
(2.098) (2.746) (4 . 824) (6.68)*** 
[ob 2 .08 3 . 061 3.607 2.9 
2.63 1. 21 0 . 961 0 . 479 
(-l. 284) (2.529) (3.755) (6 .062)*** 
-w 0 . 325 0. 162 0.369 
.552 .517 .432 
(0.588) (0.312) (0 . 852) 
* eP 0. 577 0.425 m 
. 577 . 547 
(0.999) (0.777) 
1f - 3.42 -3 .072 -3.074 - 3.154 
.934 . 846 .825 . 807 
( -3 .66) (-3.631) ( -3 .727) ( - 3 .91 )*** 
Eb -1.102 -1. 262 - 1. 339 -1. 192 
.448 .409 .387 .341 
( -2.461 ) (-3.09) (-3 .464) ( -3 .5)*** 
,., 
M -- K -7.086 -7.814 -8.41 3 -7 . 406 
2.006 1. 825 1. 613 1. 08 
( -3 .53) ( -4 .281 ) ( - 5.218) ( - 6.859)*** 
D -0 . 588 -0.693 -0.808 -0.671 
.395 .374 .335 .29 
( -1. 489) ( -1. 853) ( - 2.408) ( -2.314)** 
K 0 . 294 
.319 
(0 .923) 
-
IG 0.393 0.413 0.298 0 .418 
.271 . 267 .216 .162 
(1.453)1 ( 1. 547) (1.376) (2.585)** 
R2 0.9235 0.9126 0.9051 0. 8965 
F 8 . 047** 9 .14*** 10.899*** 12 .99*** 
DW 2.822 2.804 2.635 2. 19 
DF 15 15 15 15 
t statistics same as in equation (4.6) '. 
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Table 4.3. I nvestmen t with expected in£lation rate 
1 2 3 4 
intercept 11. 045 13. 782 17 . 704 15 .304 
10.933 9.009 5.98 3.474 
( 1. 01 ) (1. 53) (2.96) (4.405)*** 
Eob 1. 49 2. 419 3.025 2.442 
2.567 1. 713 1. 33 .631 
(--0. 581 ) ( 1.412) (2 .274) < 3. 8t8 )*** 
- 0.192 w 0.081 0.315 
. 83 .757 . 673 
(0.232) (0. 107) (0.505) 
* 
eP 0.62 0.474 m 
.879 .787 
(0.705) (0.603) 
e 
- 2.55 11" -2.121 -2.094 -2. 232 
1. 587 1. 273 1. 22 1. 4 
( -1. 606) (-1. 666) (-1. 716 ) ( -1. 958)* 
Eb -0 .848 -1. 022 -1.108 -0.98 
.705 .584 .543 .46 
(-1.202) (-1.75) (-2.04) ( -2.131)* 
M - K - 5.692 -6.459 - 7. 124 - 6.281 
3.088 2.551 2.207 1. 381 
( -1. 843) ( - 2.53) ( -3.228) ( -4.547 )*** 
D -0.413 -0.526 -0 .654 -0.538 
.607 .534 .471 
( -0.681) (-0.985) ( - 1.388) ( -1.366) 
K 0.264 
. 517 
(0.51) 
-
I G 0 .468 0.474 0 .345 0.446 
.408 . 385 .307 . 222 
( l.149) ( 1.23) (1.122) (2.011)* 
R2 0 .827 0 .8195 0.8102 0.8041 
F 3.188 3.974 4.878** 6. 158** 
DW 3.099 3.099 2.985 2.731 
DF 15 15 15 15 
t statistics same as in equation ( 4. 6) , . 
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Dropping capital stock variable did not remove the problem (equations 2) 
nor did the dropping of the intermediate imported input variable ( equa-
tions 3). Finally , the problem was removed by dropping capital stock , 
real wage and the intermediate input variables (equations 4) . Note that 
the F ratio in Table (4.3) equations 1 and 2 is not significant, also 
based on the described F test the excluded variables do not jointly 
affect the investment equation. Equations 4 in both tables can thus be 
used as a base for our conclusions. Both equations show that real bank 
loans have a significant, positive effect on the investment equation. 
Black market exchange rate , rate of depreciation , inflation and expected 
inflation have significant negative impact on private investment demand. 
Public sector investment variable is also significant and has a positive 
impac t indicating the complementarity of private and public sectors 
investments. The real resources mobilized variable has a significant 
negative impact. This could be explained by the negative average rate of 
gr owth of gross fixed capital formation which was -4 .7 during 80/ 86 (The 
UN National Account Statistics, 1989), also by 1981/82 domes tic savings 
turned negative meaning all investment was financed either by transfers 
or by borrowing from abroad (The World Bank , 1985 ). 
Finally, the dummy variable for the drought of 1984 has a signifi-
cant negative impact on private sector demand. Although we were not able 
to see the effect of the other variables that •vere used to represent the 
opportunity cost of borrowing from the curb market, namely the wage rate 
and the imported intermediate inputs variables . because of mul ti-
colinearity, still the conclusion could be made on the basis of the real 
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bank loan inflation and the black market variables. The results show 
strong impact of financial market variables on private investment with 
quantity signals (real, credit to the private sector outstanding) of 
relevance in the regulated markets, and price signals (the black market 
exchange rate depreciation , the inflation rate and the real bank loans to 
the private sector which can be interpreted in both ways) in the unregu-
lated curb market. 
The price inflation equation 
The use of the black market rate of depreciation in the right hand 
side of the price inflation equation may raise questions about the 
causality between the two . The rate of depreciation is expected to 
follow the trend of the domestic inflation (Blejer, 1978). This led to 
the use of t he first difference of the rate of depreciation of the 
instrument of the black market exchange rate in equation (3. 18 ) . Rate of 
growth of the instrument of the real bank loan was also used in (3. 18) as 
we indicated earlier. The results of fitting equation (3. 18 ) are 
reported in Table 4 . 4. (The primary results of estimation of the infla-
tion equation showed exports and government expenditure variables caused 
massive multicolinearity in the regression equation. ) Dropping sequen-
2 tially the variables with t ratio less than one on the basis of R and 
t he F test, the result for fitting the inflation e qua tion (Table 4.4, 
equation 1 ) showed that the real bank loan to the private sector vari-
ables have strong negative impact on all equa t ions . The wage variable, 
however, has a negative (wrong ) sign. As we mentioned be f ore this could 
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Table 4 . 4 . The price inflation equa tion 
l 2 3 
i nter cept 0 . 158 0. 194 0.195 
.047 .014 .015 
(3.353)** ( 13. 55 7)*** (13.182)*** 
~ob -0.532 0.628 -0. 582 
. 205 . 165 .166 
( - 2.591)** (-3.813 )*** (-3.515)*** 
w -0.469 -0 . 5323 -0.527 
.133 .106 .12 
( - 3 . 518) (-5.006) ( -4.812)*** 
"* 
eP 0 .074 0.102 
ID 
. 089 .081 
(0.83 ) (1.256 ) 
M - K 0. 786 0 . 928 0.897 
.441 . 396 .408 
(1. 781) (2 . 342)** (2. 199 )* 
-
G -0 . 404 -0.385 -0.413 
.22 .214 .22 
( -1. 837) ( -1.799 ) ( -1.879 )* 
D 0.073 0.0926 0.065 
.058 .052 .049 
( 1. 242) (1. 785 ) ( 1. 344) 
K -0. 027 
.027 
(-0.812) 
R2 0.8974 0. 8877 0.8656 
F 8.744*** 10 .541*** 11. 591*** 
DF 14 14 14 
DW 2 . 736 2 . 675 2.298 
t statistics same as in equation ( 4. 6) ' . 
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be due to that, as has been the case in agriculture, output increases as 
wages go up . This could imply that it is more profitable for producers 
to increase wages--higher curb rate and higher cost--than to reduce 
output. This also implies that the overall effect is greater output. 
This r esult again implies that restrictions of credit to the private 
sector increase cos~ of production but not necessarily prices. The 
intermediate imported input var iable has the expected positive effect but 
is insignificant in equat ions 1 and 2. The r esources mobilized and the 
goverment expenditure variables appeared with significant positive and 
negative impacts , r espectively , in equat ions 2 and 3. For the former, 
this could be due to the increasing borrowing and for ther latter , this 
could be a sign that public sector r eal investment dominates government 
real expenditure. Finally, the drought dummy a ppeared with an i nsig-
nificant positive impact. 
The real private sector loans variable and the sign of the impor ted 
intermediate input variable ( equations 1 and 2 for the latter ) seems to 
point to a stronger suppl y side, working capital cost -push inflation than 
to the demand-side, monetarist defl ationary pull in the short run. In 
the long run , however. prices could go down . if other things remain 
equal , when aggregate demand go down as a result of monetary cutback ( a 
direct impact on private sector investment here, and an indirect one on 
consumpt ion through the reduction of ou tput). 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
Stabilization programs supported by use of fund resources ty~ically 
contain among other things limitations on domestic credit expansion to 
the private sector by the banking system . Through the combination of 
limitations on overall domestic and forei gn credit, stabilization 
programs aim to contain overall credit expansion to a magnitude consis -
tent with the balance of payments , growth, and price objectives (Keller , 
1980). I n the formulation of financial programs , attention has been 
focus ed primarily on the aggregate demand effects of the financial 
variables and their implications fo r balance of payments and prices. 
The new structuralists argue that tight money forces many firms to 
t urn to an underground curb market (where higher illegal interest rates 
are charged for loans) to finance their working capital needs. The 
normal business response would be to cut back on activity and attempt to 
pass increased costs through to higher prices . The argument. thus, then 
as stated by Taylor (1983) is that even if aggregate demand falls under 
monetary constraint, aggregate supply may fall by more so that eaxcess 
demand for commodities (demand minus supply ) goes up. Further inflation-
ary press ure results. The new structuralists contend that in the short 
run at least the 'working capital cost-push' effect may offset the 
monetarist effect. 
The purpose of this study was, therefore. to test the new struc-
turalist hy pothesis in the Sudan through the use of a model that combines 
the monetarist and the new structuralist hypothesis. Specifically . the 
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output function is modelled as a function of the cost of capital stock as 
well as the costs of variable factor inputs inclusive of the curb market 
rate (credit effect on aggregate supply). 
The curb market rate is also included in the private sector invest-
ment demand equa t ion (standard monetarist effect on aggregate demand ), a 
price inflation equa.tion then is derived from the equilibrium of supply 
and demand where both monetarist and new structuralist effects work in 
the opposite directions. The econometric estimation thus answers the 
following questions: 
1. How do monetary related variables affect supply? 
2. How do monetary related variables affect demand? 
3. Which of the two effects is stronger and thus has greater 
impact on the price inflation equation in the short run . 
Given the limitations of the data base, e.g., small sample period. 
measurement error , etc .. the results seem to indicate that monetary 
related variables do affect aggregate supply in a manner consistent with 
the new structuralist argument. They also seem to affect aggregate 
demand through the standard monetarist impact. The results also seems to 
suggest that in the short run the price inflation equation is dominated 
by the cost push inflation corning from the supply side. Another source 
of support for our findings is R. Hassan (1989), where his results 
s ugges t t hat total area cropped in the mec hanized rainfed sector is 
highly responsive , particularly to the availability of short-term bank 
loans and t he expected premium on holding foreign assets. 
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To conclude, we say that one of the main constraints imposed on 
stabilization policies through their effect on inflation and unemployment 
is the existence of unofficial credit markets in Sudan. The need for 
monetary reform and the building up of efficient economy-wide monetary 
intermediaries is of crucial importance if conventional macro policy is 
to play a major role- in Sudan. In the absence of such reform, extreme 
monetary restraint, often advocated as the major component of stabiliza-
tion policy , will defeat its purpose and do more harm than good . 
The process of reform and institution-building is slow and gradual, 
however, and in the meantime it is important to beware of hasty transfers 
of theories and policies from developed institutional set-up to where 
they may be inappropriate. 
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